# Security Models

The protocol defines explicit trust boundaries across system components and external dependencies:

**Trusted**

* zkSync state finalized through validity-proof verification.

**Conditionally Trusted**

* Cross-domain messaging ordering and delivery guarantees.
* Base-layer finality assumptions anchoring zkSync settlement.

**Untrusted**

* All external execution environment state prior to validation.
* All strategy-reported values prior to oracle validation.
* All remote balance claims and position assertions.
* All cross-domain event callbacks and relayed messages.

No untrusted domain may directly mutate canonical share supply, accounting state, or net asset value (NAV).

#### Threat Model

This section enumerates the adversarial capabilities the protocol is designed to withstand.

**Adversary Capabilities Considered**

* Malicious or faulty strategy logic.
* Stale, manipulated, or delayed oracle inputs.
* Execution environment reorganization, rollback, or inconsistency.
* Temporary execution environment halts or degraded availability.
* Incorrect or adversarial profit-and-loss reporting.
* Cross-domain messaging congestion or delivery delays.
* Partial execution or incomplete unwind attempts.
* Adversarial timing behavior and race-condition exploitation.
* MEV exposure and transaction reordering within execution environments.
* Manipulation of auxiliary or reward assets.
* Flash-loan-driven valuation manipulation attempts.
* Information asymmetry across execution environments.

**Capabilities Explicitly Out of Scope**

The protocol explicitly excludes the following catastrophic failures from its threat model:

* Cryptographic failure of zkSync validity proofs.
* Base-layer consensus failure underlying zkSync settlement.
* Root-level compromise of cross-domain messaging infrastructure.
* Sustained chain-level censorship exceeding defined recovery thresholds.

These dependencies represent systemic risks outside the protocol’s control and are treated as external trust assumptions.


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